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Abstract
Turning Turing’s logic on its head, we used widespread letter-based Turing Tests found on the internet (CAPTCHAs) to shed
light on human cognition. We examined the basis of the human ability to solve CAPTCHAs, where machines fail. We asked
whether this is due to our use of slow-acting inferential processes that would not be available to machines, or whether fast-
acting automatic orthographic processing in humans has superior robustness to shape variations. A masked priming lexical
decision experiment revealed efficient processing of CAPTCHA words in conditions that rule out the use of slow inferential
processing. This shows that the human superiority in solving CAPTCHAs builds on a high degree of invariance to location
and continuous transforms, which is achieved during the very early stages of visual word recognition in skilled readers.
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Introduction
While browsing the Internet one is regularly annoyed by
requests to demonstrate that one is not a robot. The most familiar
of these CAPTCHAs - Completely Automated Public Turing test
to tell Computers and Humans Apart [1] - ask of us to type in
some sequence of distorted but common characters. They are
designed so that humans can rise to the challenge quite accurately
in a matter of seconds, while silicon-based algorithms will fail
almost certainly unless prohibitively vast computational resources
are summoned. Computer scientists might blush at how little is
currently needed to draw the line - some character deformation
and cluttering in an adversarial background has proved to be
sufficient. But equally or more humbling is that we have very little
idea how humans can actually solve CAPTCHAs. Here we
examined the basis of this operationally defining human ability.
CAPTCHAs are telling us something about the way humans
represent and process strings of letters - what we will call
orthographic processing [2]. First they inform us about what the
system is not: it is apparently not like the powerful and
sophisticated algorithms that are kept at bay by these challenges,
which however often use expensive feature extraction methods,
supervised Markov models, or computationally greedy lexical
searches through directed letter graphs [3]. Second, we are
learning just what and how much distortion the system can take
while still remaining in the comfort zone of fast and accurate
responding.
Human superiority in solving CAPTCHAs could be due to at
least two factors. One, favoured by our subjective experience,
could involve slow inferential processes to make explicit guesses on
letter identities in the face of ambiguous bottom-up information,
perhaps not unlike letter-by-letter reading. Another possibility
however is that our extensive reading experience, often in difficult
conditions (e.g., handwritten text), could have helped us develop
an automatic system for orthographic processing that is highly
tolerant to noise and shape variations in the input. Here we
eliminated the possible use of slow inferential processes by
presenting CAPTCHAs as prime stimuli in a masked priming
experiment. Prime stimuli are presented very briefly and
immediately before a clearly visible target stimulus (a real word,
e.g., TABLE, or a nonsense string of letters - a ‘‘nonword’’, e.g.,
TOBLE) that participants must classify as being a word or not [4].
This paradigm has become the ‘‘gold standard’’ in investigations
of the fast-acting automatic processes involved in skilled human
reading [5]. In our experiment, target stimuli were presented in
normal print, and prime stimuli (which could be the same word/
nonword as the target, or a different word/nonword) were
presented either as CAPTCHAs or in normal print. The relative
size of priming effects obtained from CAPTCHA primes versus
primes in normal print will indicate the extent to which our
CAPTCHA stimuli were processed automatically.
Results
262 repeated-measures ANOVAs with relatedness (Related,
Unrelated) and prime type (Print, CAPTCHA) as factors were
run separately on mean correct RTs and error rates, for
word and nonword targets (i.e., a total of 4 independent
ANOVAs). An inverse transformation was applied to the RT
data to reduce the influence of skewness and outliers [6],
and analyses were then carried out by participants (F1 statistic)
and by items (F2 statistic). ANOVAs performed on RTs trimmed
by using an arbitrary cut-off of 2.5 standard deviations for
outliers yielded the same results. Results on mean inverse RTs
to word targets revealed a main effect of relatedness
(F1(1,23)~50:85, pv:001;F2(1,78)~27:85, pv:001), a main
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effect of prime type by participants (F1(1,23)~11:01, pv:01) and
a marginal effect of prime type by items (F2(1,78)~2:84, p~:1).
The interaction between relatedness and prime type was
significant (F1(1,23)~6:48, pv:05;F2(1,78)~6:53, pv:05),
driven by an even more significant effect of relatedness for printed
primes (t(23)~5:81, pv:0001; t(78)~5:75, pv:001) than for
CAPTCHA primes (t(23)~4:16, pv:001; t(78)~2:90, pv:01).
Analyses on mean error rates to word targets revealed a main
effect of relatedness (F1(1,23)~6:22, pv:05; F2(1,78)~8:38,
pv:01), no effect of prime type (F1(1,23)~:02, p~:90;
F2(1,78)~:01, p~:91) and no interaction between the two factors
(F1(1,23)~:14, p~:71; F2(1,78)~:15, p~:70). Overall, partici-
pants produced less errors to words following a related com-
pared to an unrelated prime. No significant effects were revealed
by the analyses performed on the data for nonword targets.
The absence of priming effects for nonword targets is a standard
result in masked priming lexical decision, as reviewed in [5],
which also motivates independent ANOVAs for words and for
nonwords.
Discussion
Our results show that without rising to the level of normal
printed words, word CAPTCHAs are remarkably efficient primes
that generate a quite large and significant facilitation both in
reaction times and in error rates (see Figure 1). Given the absence
of visual overlap between primes and targets (primes and targets
had different sizes, and different cases), participants must have
extracted orthographic information from CAPTCHA stimuli
under conditions that eliminated the use of slow inferential
processes. This shows an ability of the human visual word
recognition system that complements reports of strong facilitation
with so-called ‘‘leet’’ primes (e.g. M4T3R14L-MATERIAL, [7])
or with handwritten primes [8]. Indeed our results strongly suggest
that the human superiority in solving CAPTCHAs is at least partly
due to what could be a more generic type of tolerance, not only to
the alteration of selected letters or to handwritten character
variations, but rather to global continuous input transforms and
small letter rotations –in line with recent brain imaging results on
rotated word recognition [9].
The flip-side of these findings is to hint at what might be
valuable strategies for automatic text processing algorithms and
cognitive models of reading alike, suggesting that a neuromorphic
system should not emphasize slow computations (for instance
direct searches in the lexicon) but rather might want to be
primarily constrained by the very rapid resolution of subsets of
letters under a variety of continuous transforms and rotations. This
could possibly be achieved by combining both the letter-based and
the bigram-pruning strategies proposed in [3]: first building fast
‘‘shape context representations’’ for individual letters, that indeed
seem to possess the right invariant properties, and from then
determining the most likely bigrams in the sequence, to ensure a
drastic pruning of the lexical search space.
Materials and Methods
Participants
24 participants recruited from the undergraduate and postgrad-
uate populations at Aix-Marseille University took part in the study.
All were native French speakers and reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision.
Design and Stimuli
A repeated-measures design was employed in which the three
independent variables were Lexicality (words and nonwords),
Prime Type (CAPTCHA and printed) and Relatedness (related
and unrelated). Mean response time to correct responses and
response accuracy in the lexical decision task were measured.
Prime stimuli comprised 160 CAPTCHA and their equivalent 160
printed letter strings, half of which spelled familiar French words
(5–10 letters long) and the other half readable nonwords (5–9
letters long). First, CAPTCHA stimuli were drawn from the
reCAPTCHA website [10] ensuring that these contained only
lowercase letters. All of the CAPTCHA stimuli showed a global
continuous wavelike distortion in shape, and low quality letters
tilted by at most 45 degrees from the vertical meridian. Printed
primes were then matched to CAPTCHA primes as for identity
and letter size. Target stimuli were the printed words and
nonwords in uppercase letters but in a smaller font size than the
prime stimuli so as to minimize visual overlap between the two. In
the related condition the identity of the prime and target was the
same. In the unrelated condition prime and target identities
differed but were closely matched for letter string length. Stimuli
were counterbalanced into four different lists of 160 trials with
different pseudo-randomizations using the constraints that each
target stimulus appeared once in each list and was paired with all
the different prime conditions across the lists. In each list each
experimental condition was equally represented (i.e., 20 repeti-
tions). Following a practice session of eight trials, participants were
Figure 1. Evidence for automatic processing of CAPTCHA primes. Response times and percent errors for word targets as a function of prime
condition: CAPTCHA prime vs. prime in normal print; prime is the same word as the target (grey) vs. prime is a different word (white). Error bars
indicate the between-participants standard error of the mean for each condition. Statistical analyses were carried out on inverse response times.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032121.g001
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assigned to one list of trials in a counterbalanced order. In each
list, trials were presented randomly.
Procedure
A masked priming lexical decision task was used. Participants
were run individually in a sound-attenuated room. Each
participant sat 82 cm in front of a 200 monitor. The trial sequence
of the experiment is illustrated in Figure 2. Each trial began with
the presentation of a mask in the middle of the screen for 500 ms.
Masks were designed by random scrambling, rotating and
superimposing of CAPTCHA features. The mask was replaced
at the same location with a prime for 50 ms that varied in type
(CAPTCHA or lowercase print), and relatedness to the target
(either the same or unrelated). The target stimulus then appeared
in uppercase print and varied in lexicality (word or nonword). The
target remained on the screen until participants’ response.
Participants were asked to indicate as quickly and as accurately
as possible whether the target stimulus spelled a French word or
not by pressing a response key in their right or left hand,
respectively. The next trial followed a 1000 ms blank screen
interval. E-Prime Version 2.0 controlled the randomization and
presentation of the stimuli and logged the type of response and its
latency. The experiment lasted approximately 15 minutes. In-
formed written consent was obtained from each participant before
the experiment. This research (European Research Council
#230313), including the method of consent, was approved by
the internal review board of the Universite´ de Provence.
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Figure 2. Masked priming lexical decision with CAPTCHA
primes. On any trial, participants were exposed to a masking stimulus
during 500 ms, followed by a prime for 50 ms in one of four conditions
(repetition CAPTCHA prime condition depicted), and immediately
followed by the target for a maximum of 1000 ms, which could be a
word or a nonword (word trial depicted). Participants responded
(‘‘Word’’ or ‘‘Nonword’’) using dedicated keys on the keyboard.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032121.g002
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